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Abstract 
The introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops in the mid 1990s 
appeared to be the latest in a string of technological innovations in 
agriculture. However, consumer resistance, particularly in Europe 
has limited the sector’s enthusiasm. One response to the limited 
enthusiasm has been the emergence of segregated markets for GM 
and non-GM products. These separated markets reduce economic 
welfare because they require additional costs in the marketing 
system. Offsetting these segregation costs, however, the introduc-
tion of GM technologies offers increased economic welfare through 
reduced commodity prices for consumers who are indifferent to the 
presence of GM traits and increased profits to producers who adopt 
GM technologies. This study develops the combinations of segrega-
tion costs and increased supplies that leave societal surplus un-
changed. Any GM technology that yields a larger increase in supply 
for any segregation cost depicted in this relationship meets the 
compensation principle and, thus, improves societal welfare. In this 
case, market based adoption of these technologies improve eco-
nomic surplus. On the other hand, technologies that yields less 
increase in supply for any segregation cost reduces societal wel-
fare. Under this scenario, market based adoption will not be welfare 
improving and, hence, government regulation may be required. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag überprüft die Wohlstandseffekte, die durch die Ein-
führung von Pflanzen mit gentechnisch modifizierten Organismen 
(GVO-Pflanzen) sowohl für die Erzeuger von GVO- und Nicht-GVO-
Pflanzen, als auch für die Verbraucher von GVO-und Nicht-GVO-
Pflanzen entstehen. Es wird ein partielles Gleichgewichtsmodell der 
Märkte für GVO- und Nicht-GVO-Pflanzen formuliert, das Kosten der 
Markttrennung einbezieht, wie auch die Angebotsverschiebung, die 
durch die Einführung der GVO-Pflanzen verursacht wird. Anschlie-
ßend wird das Modell verwendet, um die Kombinationen von Kosten 
der Markttrennung und von Angebotsverschiebungen zu bestim-
men, die entweder eine Verbesserung oder eine Verschlechterung 
der gesellschaftlichen Wohlfahrt mit sich bringen. In den Fällen, in 
denen durch die Einführung der GVO-Pflanzen der Wohlstand stei-
gen würde, kann eine staatliche Aktivität notwendig werden, um die 
potenziellen Verlierer durch die Einführung der GVO-Pflanzen zu 
kompensieren.  
Schlüsselwörter 
gentechnisch veränderte Lebensmittel; Kompensationsprinzip; 
Pareto-Kriterium; Kosten der Markttrennung; segmentierte Märkte 
1. Introduction 
Genetic modification of crops in the 1990s appeared ini-
tially to be the cutting edge in the ongoing quest for in-
creased efficiency of agricultural technologies. However, 
unlike previous technological innovations such as hybrid 
corn, many consumers are concerned about the long-term 
health risks associated with the consumption of genetically 
modified (GM) crops. These concerns are most apparent in 
the European Union where regulatory authorities have pro-
hibited the importation of crops such as hybrid (Bt) corn 
(SCHMITZ  et al.,  2004). Following the AKERLOF (1970) 
seminal paper ‘Market for Lemons’, GRAY et al. (2004) 
demonstrate how the quality of food creates an information 
externality associated with the release of GM crops. 
In this paper, we examine the welfare implications of intro-
ducing GM crops for GM and non-GM producers as well as 
for GM and non-GM consumers. We formulate a partial 
equilibrium model of the market for GM and non-GM crops 
that incorporates in it segregation costs and supply shifts 
caused by the introduction of GM crops. Using this partial 
equilibrium model, we derive the combinations of segrega-
tion costs and supply shifts that will leave societal welfare 
unchanged. For any fixed supply shift, segregation costs in 
excess of this equilibrium relationship results in a net de-
crease in social welfare while segregation costs lower than 
the equilibrium level results in an increase in welfare. 
Given these results we show that the adoption of GM tech-
nologies based on market incentives may actually reduce 
societal welfare. This adoption can be seen as an immiseriz-
ing technical change. 
2.  Basic segregation model 
The introduction of GM commodities in the United States 
in the late 1990s spawned several changes within US agri-
culture. As a result of these changes, users of US corn, such 
as Frito Lay and Taco Bell, now utilize only GM-free corn. 
These changes also affected the exportation of US commer-
cial GM agricultural innovations to Europe. The US live-
stock industry, however, is unconcerned with the content of 
GM corn used for livestock feed, because few US livestock 
operations cater to the non-GM meat market. This emer-
gence of a demand for GM-free products has generated a Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 8 
304 
market in which farmers, elevator operators, and processors 
incur segregation costs when pursuing a market premium 
for GM-free corn. In this section of our paper, we present 
an economic model of this market segregation. First, we 
review the implications of imperfect information within the 
segregated marketing channel. Second, we present an eco-
nomic model of the effect of these segregation costs on the 
market equilibrium for corn. 
Imperfect information enters the market for GM commodi-
ties. First, the long-run health consequences of consuming 
GM commodities are as yet unknown. While uncertainty 
implies imperfect knowledge, however, it does not consti-
tute a market imperfection (PHILIPS, 1988). Imperfect in-
formation within the economic literature refers to the sce-
nario in which uncertainty exits, but the information ob-
served by different agents differs. It is this difference in 
information known by each agent coupled with uncertainty 
that give rise to strategic behavior that distorts efficient 
markets. Thus, imperfect information about the long-run 
health consequences of consuming GM commodities im-
plies uncertainty, but unless consumers or producers have 
inside information about these consequences, the market 
equilibrium does not suffer from imperfect information. 
Thus, market equilibrium is not distorted by strategic behav-
ior. However, uncertainty about the long-run health conse-
quences of consuming altered commodities supports a re-
duction in the demand for GM commodities (OI, 1973). 
The second possible effect of imperfect information for GM 
commodities is the impact imperfect information has on the 
marketing channel. SCHMITZ et al. (2004) emphasize the 
role of segregation costs within the marketing channel. 
These segregation costs drive a wedge between the price 
received by producers and the price paid by consumers and 
results in a loss of economic surplus, which is a topic we 
develop in this paper. While segregation 
costs represent the real costs of testing and 
separating non-GM grain from GM grain, 
the costs are also affected by imperfect 
information and by strategic behavior. 
Given that production practices reducing 
the chance of a GM-contamination event 
are costly to monitor, and given that pre-
miums resulting from this segregation of 
non-GM grain give rise to strategic behav-
ior, the market channel for GM-free crops 
will cause increased testing expenses. 
SCHMITZ et al. (2004) examine the welfare 
implications of the introduction of GM 
soybeans into the marketplace by focusing 
on the advent of the costs of segregation 
for non-GM crops and by pinpointing the 
supply shifts resulting from the costs sav-
ings afforded by this new technology. 
Their study took additional segregation 
costs and supply shifts as fixed and deter-
mined the net welfare effect of the GM-
corn contamination event. This paper 
extends the SCHMITZ et al. basic formula-
tion by solving for the combination of 
segregation costs and supply shifts that 
leave societal welfare unchanged. Building 
on the insights of SCHMITZ et al., supply 
shifts higher than what would be required to offset the in-
cremental segregation costs improve societal welfare while 
supply shifts lower than that level result in a net loss of 
societal welfare surplus. 
We present the general form of a segregation model in 
figure 1, in which there is a net excess supply of non-GM 
corn  N ES  defined as the supply of non-GM corn  N S  less 
the demand for non-GM corn  N D . This graphical represen-
tation is consistent with the state of the US corn market 
prior to the introduction of GM corn. While RUNGE and 
RYAN (2003) indicate that 40% of all US corn planted in 
2003 was GM corn, LIN (2002) finds that only 1% to 2% of 
US corn demand is sensitive to GM content. Thus, at cur-
rent market prices, the supply of non-GM corn exceeds the 
demand for non-GM corn. Segregation costs shift the ex-
cess supply curve of non-GM corn outwardly from  N ES  to 
N ES′ , which results from the inward shift in demand from 
N D  to  N D′  due to segregation costs. The excess demand of 
GM corn  C ED is defined as the demand of potential GM 
corn  C D  less the supply of potential GM corn  G S . Before 
segregation costs are introduced, 
D
N Q  bushels of corn are 
consumed for non-GM uses and 
S
N Q  bushels of corn are 
produced. Likewise, before segregation costs are imposed, 
G Q  bushels of GM corn are produced and  C Q  bushels of 
corn are consumed by uses that are not sensitive to GM 
content. After the introduction of segregation costs 
* Q  
bushels of non-GM corn are consumed and  E Q  bushels of 
non-GM corn are produced. Similarly, the quantity of GM 
corn produced falls to  G Q′  bushels while the consumption 
of potential GM corn increases to  C Q′ . Given the excess 
Figure 1.   Effect of segregation costs on the market price for  
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supply of non-GM corn, it is impossible for a price premium 
to emerge in excess of segregation costs  10 PP − . As a result, 
the price of corn received by farmers falls from  P  to  0 P . 
The market equilibrium, given segregation costs τ and 
supply shifts due to GM technologies  , ψ  can be written as 
(1)  () ( ) ( )







τ= + τ+ =
++ ψ =
 
where  p is the prevailing market price;  () ,
T Dp τ  is the 
total demand for the crop;  ( )
N Dp +τ  is the non-GM de-
mand;  ()
G Dp  is the undifferentiated or GM demand; 
()
N Sp  is the supply of non-GM output; ψ  is the shift in 
supply due to the adoption of GM crops;  ( )
G Sp  is the 
supply of GM crop; and  ()
T Sp  is the total supply of both 
non-GM and GM crops. Based on the market equilibrium in 
equation 1, we show that the introduction of GM crops 
reallocates producer and consumer surplus for both GM and 
non-GM producers and consumers. In general, non-GM 
producers and consumers lose with the introduction of GM 
varieties. Non-GM consumers lose because of the introduc-
tion of segregation costs. Non-GM producers lose because 
of the reduction in non-GM demand that shifts the aggre-
gate demand curve to the left (SCHMITZ et al., 2004) and 
because of increased competition from GM producers 
whose supply curves increase as they adopt new GM tech-
nologies. The net gain for GM producers can be positive or 
negative depending on the relative supply and demand 
elasticities and on the nature of the supply shift associated 
with the release of GM crops. However, GM-crop consum-
ers gain unambiguously from the introduction of GM tech-
nology.
1 The net gain or net loss to society based on these 
changes is an open question that depends on the relative 
size of the segregation costs and of the supply shift. 
3.  Welfare changes from the introduction of 
genetically modified crops 
In this application, we define the societal welfare from the 
corn market as 
(2) 
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where  N p  is the choke price for non-GM consumers;  G p  is 
the choke price for GM consumers; 
* p  is the equilibrium 
                                                           
1   The finding that the increase in demand will lead to an unam-
biguous increase in consumer welfare must be viewed with 
caution. DIXIT and NORMAN (1978) and ALSTON et al. (1999) 
find that changes in demand resulting from advertising do not 
always increase social welfare. In the case of DIXIT and NOR-
MAN, deviation is linked to market power; the result obtained 
by ALSTON et al. appears to be the result of adding-up restric-
tions on a demand system. 
price that is defined as the price that equates the total quan-
tity demanded and the total quantity supplied in equation 1 
for a given combination of segregation costs and supply 
shifts;  N p  is the choke price for non-GM producers;  G p  is 
the choke price for GM producers; and  () , W τψ  is the wel-
fare from the production and consumption of corn as a func-
tion of the segregation costs and of the supply shift. Be-
cause of segregation costs, we have defined these integrals 
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Separating the result of equation 3, the first component of a 
change in welfare results directly from a change in the equi-
librium price. As the equilibrium price increases, consumer 
surplus for both GM consumers and non-GM consumers 
declines as the producer surplus for both GM producers and 
non-GM producers increases. However, the increase in 
segregation costs implies a reduction in the non-GM con-
sumer surplus, while the supply shift implies an increase in 
producer surplus that accrues to GM producers. 
The change in societal welfare resulting from the need to 
segregate GM corn from non-GM corn can be derived from 
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Similarly, the change in societal welfare resulting from a 
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In order to proceed further, we first assume that a market 
equilibrium exists so that  











Taking a first-order Taylor series expansion around the 
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where the first order specification results in a parallel shift 
in both the supply relationship ( ) 1+ψ  and in each demand 
equation. Equilibrium (
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Substituting this result into equation 4 and setting 
0 dd ψτ = yields the result that the imposition of segrega-
tion costs on the marketing channel for GM crops without a 
shift in supply reduces societal welfare. Unfortunately, the 
direction of the change in price with respect to the increase 
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could be positive or negative. Thus, the effect of the shift in 
supply is dependent on the supply elasticity and on the 
demand elasticity. 
4.  Self-enforcing innovation: when  
technological change meets the  
compensation principle 
The foregoing discussion follows the SCHMITZ et al. (2004) 
approach of examining the impact of adding segregation 
costs independent from the potential shift in supply. How-
ever, it is possible that some combination of segregation 
cost and supply shift exists such that it leaves societal sur-
plus unchanged. Equation 3 can be solved for those combi-
nations of τ and ψ  so that  ( ) ,0 dW τψ = . These solutions 
of social welfare separate the set of all possible segregation 
costs and supply shifts into those change that increase so-
cial welfare (i.e., those innovations where the compensation 
principle is met) and those solutions that decrease social 
welfare (i.e., those innovations that are immiserizing). 
To derive the combinations of segregation costs and supply 
shifts that leave societal surplus unchanged, we begin   
with the 2003/04 US corn baseline obtained from the US 
Department of Agriculture baseline quantity supplied of 
10.2 billion bushel at a price of US$ 2.35 per bushel. We 
assume that 2% of the corn consumed in the United States 
is stipulated GM-free (LIN, 2002) and that 40% of the corn 
planted is GM corn (RUNGE and RYAN, 2003). Next, we 
assume two linear derived-demand curves that have a de-
rived-demand elasticity for US non-GM corn of –0.2 and an 
aggregate derived demand elasticity for US corn of –0.3. 
Finally, we assume that the supply of both GM corn and 
non-GM corn equals 0.5 and that the shutdown price for 
both supply curves is US$ 1.25 per bushel. In table 1 (col-
umn 1), we reproduce the baseline production and con-
sumption of GM or non-GM corn. 
We now introduce a segregation cost of US$ 0.05 per 
bushel and solve numerically for the increase in supply that 
leaves overall surplus unchanged. Thus, if 40% of the ori-
ginal supply is GM corn, a 0.3% increase in the supply of 
GM corn will leave the aggregate surplus unchanged. This 
combination of segregation costs and supply shifts results 
in a 0.14% price decline in the market price for US non-
GM corn from US$ 2.35 per bushel to US$ 2.347 per 
bushel. Combining this change in market price with the 
corresponding costs of segregation, non-GM consumers 
will pay US$ 2.397 per bushel following the introduction of 
segregation costs. Given this increase in the price of GM-
free corn, the demand for non-GM corn will fall by 0.4% 
from 0.2 billion bushels to 0.199 billion bushels. Similarly, 
as the price paid for GM or undifferentiated corn declines, 
the demand for GM corn will increase from 10.000 billion 
bushels to 10.004 billion bushels. Thus, the demand for all 
US corn will increase only slightly from 10.200 billion 
bushels to 10.203 billion bushels. 
Since the price of GM corn received by farmers net of seg-
regation costs declines, the quantity of non-GM corn on the 
supply side of the market will decline by 0.004 billion 
bushels. However, this decline is more than offset by the 
0.008 billion bushel increase in the supply of GM corn. The 
increased supply of GM corn is largely the result of the 
0.3% supply shift introduced in the marketplace from the 
introduction of innovative GM technology at the farm level. 
This outward shift, however, is offset partially by the reduc-
tion in the price of corn. 
By construction, we hold societal welfare in table 1 con-
stant at US$ 49.989 billion. However, the introduction of 
GM corn affects the allocation of economic surplus across 
all producers and consumers of GM and non-GM corn. 
Numerically, the surplus of non-GM consumers falls from 
US$ 1.175 billion to US$ 1.166 billion, which is a decline 
of 0.8%. Similarly, non-GM producers will experience a 
0.3% loss in producer surplus, and GM producers will ex-
perience a small net loss of producer surplus. The gain in 
welfare accrues to those consumers who are not concerned 
about the difference between GM and non-GM corn. Thus, 
the GM corn consumer surplus will increase from US$ 
38.907 billion to US$ 38.939 billion. Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 8 
307 
From the above, the change in economic rents due to the 
introduction of GM technologies with associated segrega-
tion costs and increased supply will be zero. If the GM 
consumers who gain from the introduction of the technol-
ogy pay the losses of the non-GM producers, non-GM con-
sumers, and GM producers who are the losers, the gainers 
will be indifferent to the introduction of the GM technology 
and to the use of traditional varieties. Holding the segrega-
tion costs constant at US$ 0.05 per bushel, however, a sup-
ply shift for GM corn of more than 0.3% will yield a net 
increase in societal welfare. Thus, if the introduction of a 
GM technology yields a supply increase of more than 0.3%, 
the gainers who are the GM consumers could compensate 
the losses of the losers who are the non-GM producers, 
non-GM consumers, and GM producers such that the GM 
consumers will remain better off. 
In figure 2, we extend the numerical results of table 1 by 
depicting the combinations of segregation costs and supply 
shifts that leave societal welfare unchanged. The lowest 
frontier is associated with the baseline scenario 
of table 1 in that 2% of the original supply is 
sensitive to the introduction of GM corn. Two 
other scenarios are presented in figure  2 in 
which the highest locus of points depicts the 
solution where the non-GM demand for corn is 
4% of the supply of original corn while the 
middle locus of points represents solutions 
where the GM demand for corn is 2% of the 
original supply of corn. Along the locus of 
point for the baseline 2% solutions, the gain to 
individuals from the introduction of GM tech-
nologies is exactly the same as the loss in-
curred by the losers. For combinations of seg-
regation costs and supply shifts above this 
relationship, the introduction of GM technolo-
gies results in a net increase in societal wel-
fare. Thus, the introduction of GM technolo-
gies for combinations of segregation costs and 
supply shifts above this relationship meet the 
compensation principle. 
Specifically, a low separation cost relative to the supply 
shift (than depicted in the linear relationship between seg-
regation costs and shift in supply in figure 2) implies in-
creased societal welfare from the market adoption of GM 
technology. Alternatively, a large segregation cost relative 
to the supply shift will imply a loss in societal welfare with 
the introduction of GM technologies, even if the GM con-
sumers gain from technological adoption. Under the latter 
scenario, society is better off without the introduction of 
GM crops. 
The boundary between the combination of segregation costs 
and supply shifts that meet the compensation principle is 
fragile to several factors in the segregation model of equa-
tion 1. Most notably, the frontier is dependent on the rela-
tive share of non-GM demand. The two other relationships 
give the combination of segregation costs and supply shifts 
that leave societal surplus unchanged as the share   
of the non-GM demand for corn increases relative to total 
corn demand. As the relative size of the non-GM corn de-
mand increases, the shift in supply required to 
offset the segregation costs also will increase. 
Hence as the share of non-GM demand increases, 
the potential role of government regulation via 
market operation will also increase. 
5.  Pareto, compensation, and im- 
     miserizing technological change 
From the foregoing discussion in the presence of 
segregation costs and supply shifts, the adoption 
of GM technologies cannot be Pareto improving 
assuming compensation is not paid. Non-GM 
consumers, non-GM producers, and GM produc-
ers all lose while GM consumers gain with the 
release of GM varieties. 
However, certain combinations of segregation 
costs and supply shifts will leave societal welfare 
unchanged. Technological change that yields a 
larger supply shift for given segregation costs will 
meet the compensation principle. This implies that 
market-based decisions to adopt such technolo-
Table 1.   Market solutions with societal welfare constant 
  Segregation costs ($/bushel) 
  0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Percent increase in supply  0.000 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.013
 
Equilibrium  price  2.350 2.347 2.344 2.340 2.337 2.334
   
Non-GM corn demanded  0.200 0.199 0.198 0.198 0.197 0.196
GM corn demanded  10.000 10.004 10.008 10.012 10.016 10.021
  total demand  10.200  10.203 10.207 10.210 10.213 10.217
 
Non-GM corn supplied  6.120 6.116 6.112 6.107 6.103 6.099
GM corn supplied  4.080  4.088 4.095 4.102 4.110 4.117
  total supply  10.200  10.203 10.207 10.210 10.213 10.217
 
Non-GM consumer surplus  1.175 1.166 1.156 1.147 1.138 1.129
GM consumer surplus  38.907 38.939 38.971 39.003 39.035 39.067
  total consumer surplus  40.082 40.105 40.128 40.150 40.173 40.196
 
Non-GM producer surplus  5.944 5.925 5.905 5.886 5.866 5.847
GM producer surplus  3.963 3.960 3.957 3.953 3.950 3.947
  total producer surplus  9.907  9.884  9.862 9.839 9.816 9.793
 
     societal surplus  49.989 49.989 49.989 49.989 49.989 49.989
Source: authors’ computations 
Figure 2.  Combinations of supply shift and segregation costs that 
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gies improve societal welfare. Alternatively, technological 
changes that produce smaller shifts in supply for given seg-
regation costs reduce societal welfare, hence government 
regulations to discourage GM adoption may be warranted. 
The introduction of GM crops could separate both produc-
ers and consumers into two groups (GRAY et al., 2004). 
Some producers may find the adoption of GM technology 
will be advantageous, while another group may find that the 
benefits of GM technologies will not exceed their costs. 
Similarly, consumers may decide that the consumption of 
GM commodities will not decrease their expected utility, 
while other consumers may be more risk adverse and de-
cide that GM commodities will decrease their expected 
utility (OI, 1073). Other economic agents, including proces-
sors and grain-elevator operators involved in the corn mar-
ket, may serve as middlemen for a choice made by a pro-
ducer. Each group of consumers and/or producers may 
optimize its preference independently, but each group will 
be affected by the decision of the remaining group. For 
example, consumers who choose not to consume GM 
commodities are exposed to higher commodity prices due 
to positive segregation costs because of the adoption deci-
sions made by producers who choose to adopt GM tech-
nologies. Similarly, GM producers may be affected by 
reduced demand for corn that can result from the decision 
by some consumers to not consume GM commodities. 
If producers have an incentive to adopt GM technology 
while the net welfare effect of adoption is negative, in this 
case it leads to immiserizing growth.
2 Thus, adoption of 
GM technologies may be in the best interest of some pro-
ducers. As demonstrated in our welfare model in this paper, 
the welfare impact on non-GM consumers and producers 
may more than offset the welfare gain to the adopters. In 
this sense the innovation is an immiserizing technical change. 
As demonstrated earlier, from a policy context it is unlikely 
that the introduction of GM technologies will ever meet the 
Pareto principle. Thus, the question facing policymakers is 
whether or not the introduction of these technologies could 
meet the compensation principle. If the introduction of GM 
technologies fail to meet the compensation principle, it is 
possible that producers will decide optimally to adopt the 
new technology even though such adoption represents an 
immiserizing technical change. However, it is conceivable 
that the introduction of GM technologies could meet the 
compensation principle, hence the introduction of GM 
technology could be welfare improving. The role of gov-
ernment is quite different under each scenario. If the tech-
nological change is immiserizing, government ban on GM 
technology would improve social welfare. On the other 
hand, the government should let the market determine 
whether GM technologies should be adopted if the technol-
ogy meets the compensation principle. 
6.  Conclusions 
The introduction of GM crops in the 1990s appears to be 
the latest innovation in the agricultural sector that would 
                                                           
2   SCHUMPETER (1942) introduces the idea of immiserizing tech-
nical change in that technical change leaves overall economic 
well-being less profitable than it was before the innovation 
was applied. 
yield benefits to society through lower food prices. Emerg-
ing consumer concerns regarding the long-term health ef-
fects of GM crops has raised several issues about the eco-
nomic benefits of such new technologies. One response to 
consumer concerns has been the establishment of segre-
gated market channels for GM-free commodities. This 
approach represents a market-based response to biotechnol-
ogy as opposed to the regulatory approach implicit in the 
moratoria on the importation or production of GM crops. 
In this paper, we examined whether or not the introduction 
of GM crops meet the compensation principle. Combina-
tions of segregation costs and supply shifts that do not meet 
the compensation principle result in net welfare losses to 
society. If the adoption of such technologies is left up to the 
marketplace, the resulting technological change will be 
immiserizing. This possibility suggests a role for govern-
ment regulation rather than relying on market mechanism to 
dictate the release of GM varieties. 
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